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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE O·F UTAH 
NATIONAL FAR'MERS UNION 
PROPERTY AND 
CASUALTY COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
FARMERS INSURANCE 
GROUP and FARMERS 
INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 9625 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
This is an action brought by the plaintiff, an 
insurance company, to recover from the defendant, 
~another insurance company, attorney fee's and court 
costs which the plaintiff incurre'd in defending an 
action brought against John H. Morgan, Jr., the 
named insured under a policy of liability insurance 
issued to him by the plaintiff. The plaintiff, who 
admittedly insured John H. Morgan, Jr., seeks to 
recover these attorney fees and costs from the de-
fendant upon the theory that the defendant was 
the primary liability insurance carrier, a fact which 
is assumed in the Appellant's Brief (see page 1). 
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The defendant denies that it afforded any insurance 
coverage whatsoever under its policy to John H. 
Morgan, Jr. which was in force and effect at the 
time of and under the conditions of the accident 
out of which the above mentioned action arose. 
DISPOSTTION OF THE LOWER COUR'T 
The case \Vas tried to the Court, who found in 
favor of the defendant, concluding as set out on 
page 41 of the Record: 
"3. The attorney fees and costs incur-
red by the plain tiff were incurred by the 
plaintiff and not by John H. Mor~an, Jr. 
and were incurred by the plaintiff primarily 
for the benefit of the plaintiff, and John H. 
Morgan, Jr. is not obligated to reimburse the 
plaintiff for any attorney fees or costs in-
curre'd. 
"4. The defendant Farmers Insurance 
Exchange has no obligation under its policy 
to reimburse the plaintiff for attorney fees 
or costs it incurred in the defense of the ac-
tion against John H. Morgan, Jr." 
The Farmers Insurance Group is not a legal 
entity but is merely an association of insurance com-
panies of which the F1armers Insurance Exchange 
is one. Said Group issues no policies of insurance 
and is not involved in this 'action. The case was dis-
missed as to said Group by the trial court, of which 
the plaintiff does not complain. The words "de-
fendant", "defendants", "respondent" 'and '"'respon-
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
dents" are used in this brief to refer to the Farmers 
Insurance Exchange. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
The defendant and respondent seeks to sus-
tain the judgment of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts is set out in the Ap-
pellant's Brief herein (pages 2, 3, 4 and '5) and 
the following i's intended merely to supplement that 
Statement. 
Since the question 1as to whether the defendant 
and respondent afforded John H. Morgan, Jr. any 
coverage for the damages arising out of or the costs 
of defending 'a lawsuit arising out of the accident 
described in plaintiff's and Appel1ant's Brief de-
pends upon an interpretation of the in'surance policy, 
it is im portJant that we have the pertinent provisions 
of the policy before us. The named insured under 
the defendant's policy of insurance was Raymond 
Earl Thom~as ( R. 26-31). The policy, Exhibit D-2, 
provides: 
" ( 2) the unqualified word 'insured' in-
cludes (a) the name insured . . . and (b) 
with respect to the described automobile, ... 
and any other person or organizations legally 
responsible for its use, provided the actual 
use of the automobile is by the named insured 
or with his permission. 
" ( 3) the term 'the insured' is used sev-
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erally and not collectively, but the inclusion 
herein of more than one insured shall not in-
crease the limits of the Exchange's liability." 
As to coverage, the Exchange agrees, within the 
limits of the policy 
"To pay all damages which the insured 
becomes legally obliged to pay because of: 
"(A) bodily injury to ·any person, 
and/or 
'' (B) damage to property, arising out 
of the ownership, maintenance or use of an 
automobile as hereinafter defined, and to de-
fend at its expense any suit against the in-
sured for such damages; but the Exchange 
may make such settlement of any claim or suit 
as it deems advisable." 
In addition, under Supplementary Payments, 
"The Exchange ·also agrees to pay, in 
addition to the applicable limit of liiability: 
"(b) all expenses incurred by the Ex-
change, all costs taxed against the insured in 
any such suit, and all interest accruing after 
entry of judgment until the Exchange has 
paid, tendered, or deposited in court that part 
of the judgment which does not exceed the 
limit of the Exchang~'s liability thereon; ... " 
Under Exclusions the policy provide's: 
"'This policy does not apply under Part 1: 
"6. while the described ·automobile is 
being used in the automobile business, but 
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this exclusion does not apply to the named in-
sured or his relatives; 
" 
In the section of the policy designated Con-
ditions, paragraph (17), the policy provi1des 
"'Under Coverages A, B, (set out above) 
E and F, the Exchange shall not be liable for 
a greater proportion of any los's than the :~p­
licable limit of liability stated in the declara-
tions bears to the total applicable limit of all 
collectible insurance against such loss." (Par-
en thesis ours) 
The policy of National Farmers Union Prop-
erty & Casualty Company, which insured the auto-
mobile belonging to John H. Morgan, Jr., Exhibit 
P-1, is sin1ilar to that of the defendant. Under its 
terms the plaintiff agrees, under the section entitled 
"SupplementJa;ry Payments" 
"With respect to such insurance as is af-
forded by this policy for bodily injury liabi-
lity and for property damage liability, the 
company shall: 
" ( 2) pay all expenses incurred by the 
company, all costs taxed against the insured 
in :any such suit 'and all interest accruing after 
entry of judgment until the company has paid 
or tendered or deposited in court such part 
of such judgment as does not exceed the limit 
of the company's liability thereon; 
" 
Under the section applicable to other insur-
ance, plaintiff's policy also provides 
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"If the insured has o t h e r insurance 
against a loss covered by this policy the com-
pany shall not be liable under this policy for 
a greater proportion of such loss than the 
applicable limit of liability stated in the dec-
larations bears to the total applicable limit 
of liability of all valid and collectible insur-
ance against such loss, provided, however, 
under coverages A and B the insurance with 
respect to temporary substitute automobiles 
under Insuring Agreement IV or other auto-
mobiles under Insuring Agreement V shall 
be excess insurance over any other valid and 
collectible insurance.'' 
It should be further pointed out that the at-
torney fees and costs which we are talking ~about in 
this case were not incurred by or are not owed by 
John H. Morgan, Jr. but were rather incurred by 
the plaintiff, National Farmers Union Property 
& Casualty Company (R. 28), an'd that the p1ain-
tiff does not assert any claim by or through John 
H. Morgan, Jr. against the defendant but rather 




THE AUTOMOBlLE DRIVEN BY 1Ji0HN H. MOR-
G.NN, JR. WAS 'BE'ING USED IN THE AUTOMOBILE 
BUSINESS AND, THEREFORE, WAS NOT COVERED 
BY THE DEFENDANT'S POLI'CY. 
The defendant denied that it owed any cover-
age in this case by reason of the foregoing provi-
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sions in its policy, which provided that claims aris-
ing while the described automobile wa's being used 
in the ~automobile business by someone other than 
the named insured or his relatives are not covered. 
The undisputed evidence shows that Raymond Earl 
Thomas, the named insured under the defendant's 
policy, was a salesman employed by the Bountiful 
Moto1· Sales ( R. 27). Mr. Morgan had purchased 
the vehicle, which he was having repaired, from the 
Bountiful Motor Sales, then known as J. Golden 
Barton Motor Company (R. 2'6). While his auto-
mobile was being repaired he asked Kay Browning, 
service manager of the Bountiful Motor Sales, if 
he might use another automobile (R. 27). Mr. 
Browning had no such vehicle available and referred 
Mr. Morgan to Dean Roberts, who had sold Mr. 
Morgan's automobile to him (R. 27). Deian Roberts 
did not have a car, but in turn referred Mr. Morgan 
to Raymond Earl Thomas. Mr. Thomas let Mr. Mor-
gan take his own automobile ( R. 27). Mr. Morgan 
took the car to his own home ~and parked it in his 
driveway and went in the house. While he was in 
the house his little girl came out to the car in the 
driveway and in some way jarred the brake or let 
the brake off and the car rolled down the driveway 
into the building owned by Daniel T. Wolfe, who 
thereafter brought the aforementioned legal action 
against John H. Morgan, Jr. 
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It is the contention of the defendant, Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, that the automobile belonging 
to Raymond Earl Thom~as was being used in the 
automobile business at the time of the accident in 
the same manner that a demonstrator or other ve-
hicle which may have belonged to the garage may be 
used. Mr. Morgan was a customer of Bountiful 
Motor Sales; he had brought his own car to that 
company for repair; he had previously purchased 
the same car from the Motor Company; and it does 
not appear unreason1a:ble to infer that the Bountiful 
Motor Sales was interested in keeping his good-will 
in the hope that it might continue to receive his 
patronage. 'There is nothing in the record to the ef-
feet that Raymond Earl Thomas even knew John 
H. Morgan, Jr. prior to his letting Mr. Morgan take 
his 1automohile. It should, therefore, be obvious that 
this iis not a case of one person doing a favor for 
another or of a friend accommodating a friend. It 
it is rather a man, who is interested in selling auto-
mobiles, letting a potential customer drive 1an auto-
mobile in the hope that he might thereby retain a 
customer's good-will and continued patronage. 
The provision of the policy eliminating auto-
mobiles used "in the automdbile business" is new 
and there is a scarcity of cases construing this pro-
vision. 
"The usuial omnibus clause in an auto-
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mobile liability policy excludes coverage of ac-
cidents arising out of use of an automobile by 
persons operating an automobile repair shop, 
public garage, sales agency, service station, 
or public parking place. This annotation con-
siders what constitutes use of a vehicle 'in 
the automobile business,' another way of 
phrasing such an exclusion in a liability 
policy .... 
"A diligent search has revealed only one 
case interpreting the phrase 'in the automo-
bile business,' as used in an exclusionary 
clause in an automobile liability policy. 
"In Cherat v. United States Fi(lelity & 
Guaranty Co. (1959, CA 10 Okla.) 2164 F. 2d 
767, 17 ALR '2d 9'59, the court reversed a 
judgment declaring that two insurance com-
panies which had issue'd conventional liability 
policies, one to the owner and the other to the 
repairer of an automobile involved in an acci-
dent while driven by the repairman, were not 
required to defend an action for damages 
from the accident because of exclusionary 
clauses in each of the policies, the owner's 
policy excluding coverage of 'an owned auto-
mobile while used in the automobile business,' 
and the repairman's excluding 'a non-owned 
automobile while used ( 1) in the automobile 
business by the insured,' and ~also provi'ding 
that 'automobile business means the business 
of selling, repairing, servicing, storing or 
parking of automobiles.' ... " 71 A.L.R. (2d) 
.964 
In another case, McCree v. Jenning (Washing-
ton), 349 Pac. (2d) 1071, in which it was decided 
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that the exclusion did not apply, the Court defined 
the phrase to mean 
"It would appear evident, therefore, that 
an automobile 'used in the automobile busi-
ness,' would be one which was employed for 
some purpose in connection with that business. 
For example, a tow truck, an automobile used 
for demonstration purposes, or a vehicle used 
for securing or delivering equipment and sup-
plies would be 'used in the business.' But the 
Jenning automobile was not turned over to 
Miller to be used by him for his business pur-
poses. It was simply brought to him to be 
repaire'd. '' 
The underlying principle exclu~ding !aUtomobiles 
used in the automobile business, except in the case 
of the named insured or h:ls relatives, from cover-
age under a liability policy is as stated in an anno-
tation in 47 A.L.R. (2d) 556, wherein the omnibus 
clause exception relating to public 'garages, sales 
~agencies, service stations and the like is discussed: 
''It has been said that the ·reason :for re-
striction of liability as to automobile repair 
shops, garages, etc., in 'automobile liability 
insurance policies is clear, there being so many 
more occasions when some irresponsible per-
son would be apt to be driving the ear in 
question in the operation of such an estab-
lishment. Buxton v. Randel ('1944) 159 Kan. 
245, 154 P. 2d 129." 
While the cases included in the foregoing an-
notation at 47 A.L.R. (2d) 556 ·are not strictly in 
10 
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point since they discuss cases in which the omnibus 
clause contains an exception or proviso, the effect 
of which is to declare the clause inapplicable to a 
public garage, automobile repair shop, automobile 
sales agency, automobile service station and agents 
or employees thereof, or some similar provision, an 
examination of some of the eases included in the 
annotation will serve to illustrate the purpose of the 
exclusion and the philosophy behind it. On page 558 
of the annotation it is said: 
"An automobile repair shop owner to 
whom the named assured has entrusted his car 
for purposes of sale, the me1ans and methods 
of accomplishing which are left wholly dis-
cretionary, acts, while demonstrating the car 
to a prospective purchaser, not as the servant 
or agent of the named assured, but 'as an in-
dependent con tractor, 1and so, as regards an 
accident occurring while he is so demonstrat-
ing the car, comes within the operation of a 
proviso in an omnibus cia use containing an 
exception whereby such clause is made inap-
plicable to a public automobile garrage, auto-
mobile repair shop, automobile sales agency, 
automobile service station, and the agents or 
employees thereof. State, use of Tondi v. Fidel-
ity & Casualty Co. ( 1929) 156 Md. 684, 145 
A 182, in which the court s'aid that the pro-
viso in the policy would h1ave but little mean-
ing if the owner of an automobile repair shop 
could step outside, disassociate himself tem-
porarily from his business, proceed to sell a 
car which for days had been left at his place 
of business to be sold, and then successfully 
11 
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claim that he was not excluded by the pro-
. " VlSO ••• 
On page 560 it is said: 
"A casualty insurance company was held 
in Macbeith v. Lacey ( 1944, Pa.) 92 Pitts b. 
Leg. J. 1, not liable unaer 'a policy excluding 
from coverage public garages, automobile re-
pair shops, sales agencies, and service sta-
tions, and agents and employees thereof, and 
a compulsory nonsuit was entered in favor of 
the insurance company, as garnishee, where 
fatal injuries had been sustained by the plain-
tiff's decedent while a passenger in the insur-
ed !automobile, which was being operated by 
the service-sales manager of an automobile 
dealer, a prospective customer of a tire and 
service agency to which the owner had loaned 
his car for dem'Onstration of a new make of 
tires." 
Under cases containing an exception relating 
to public garages, sales agencies, service stations 
an'd the like the fact that an automobile is 'being 
operated in such business, either as a personal ac-
commodation or without consideration, has been held 
not to take the case outside of the exception. 
In Canadian Indemnity Company v. Western 
National Insur.ance Company, ( 19155), 134 Cal. App. 
('2d) 512, 286 Pac. ( 2d) '532 the Canadi,an Indem-
nity Company issued its ·comprehensive li,ability 
policy to Burnett covering his Auto Repair Shop 
and Service Station including liability arising out 
of the use of any automobile in connection with the 
12 
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operations of such station. The Western National 
Insurance Company issued to Mercer a basic stan-
dard automobile policy covering his Lincoln auto-
mobile. Mercer was an employee of Burnett. On 
occasion, Burnett used Mercer's Lincoln to pick up 
spare parts needed in Burnett's repair business. 
On June 2, 1953, Mercer arrive'd at the gar1age 
at 4 :30 P.M. Mercer informed Burnett that he need-
ed certain repair parts for a customer's car which 
Mercer had ordered from Richmond Motors, but 
which had not been delivered by Richmond Motors' 
salesman, Williams. When Burnett ordered parts, if 
he could not go ~after them, Williams, who was a 
personal as well as a business friend of Burnett, 
would deliver them. Mercer asked Burnett to pick 
up the order. Burnett borrowed Mercer's Lincoln 
for that purpose. Burnett learned. that William·s was 
ill. He took the parts order with him, intending prin-
cipally to pick up the repair parts, but was on his 
way first to see Williiams before going on to Rich-
mond Motors. Williams' home and Richmond Mo-
tors were in the same general direction. An ;accident 
occurred 14 blocks from Williams' home and 10 
blocks from Richmond Motors. 
The Canadian Indemnity Company brought this 
action for a declaratory judgment ~against the West-
ern National Insurance Company contending that 
the policies pro rated Burnett's liability and ap-
13 
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pealed from a judgment decreeing that the Oanadian 
Indemnity Company was responsible and that the 
Western Insurance Company was not. 
The District Court of Appeal affirmed, hold-
ing that the evidence clearly supported the holding 
(1) that the Lincoln was being used by the garage 
owner for a purpose connected with the garage busi-
ness, (2) that Burnett had not departed from or 
abandoned his purpose of obtaining repair parts 
by driving toward Williams' home en route, and 
('3) th!at coverage for Burnett was therefore ex-
cluded un'der the Garage Exception to the omnibus 
clause of Mercer's policy with the Western Insurance 
Company. 
In the case of Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corp-
oration v. Blackstock (193'5), 165 Va. 98, 1'81 S.E. 
364 the insurer issued its policy to Wynn covering 
her automobile. Taylor operated ·a filling station, 
Wynn was ~a customer of long standing. Wynn's 
automobile developed a frozen radiator while being 
operated by a brother of Wynn. The brother called 
Taylor an'd !asked him to come for the automobile 
and take it to his ·service station to thaw it out or 
do whatever was necessary to the radiator. The 
brother knew that Taylor's service station contained 
1a heated wash pit in which an automobile could be 
thawed out. 
·Taylor got the automobile and on the way to 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the service station had an accident. Blackstock was 
injured. Blackstock recovered a judgment against 
Taylor and then brought this action against the in-
surer. The insurer appealed from an adverse judg .. 
ment. 
The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, hold-
ing that the accident arose out of the operation of 
the service station rather than as a part of 'an in-
dividual accommodation to the brother, whether 
Taylor expected to charge for the service or merely 
genertal service to valuable customers. 
POINT II. 
THE DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT IS NOT 
OBLIGATED TO REIMBURSE THE PLAINTIFF FOR 
ANY ATTORNEY FEES OR COSTS INCURRED IN 
THE DEFENSE OF THE ACTION AGAINST JOHN 
H. MORGAN, JR. 
While the defendant and respondent relied pri-
marily upon the defense set out in Point I above, 
the court below actually decided this case in the 
defendant's favor upon the ground set out 'in its 
Conclusions Of Law (R. 41), to the effect that the 
attorney fees and costs incurred by the plaintiff 
were incurred by the pltain tiff and not by John H. 
Morgan, Jr., were incurred by the plaintiff primar-
ily for its own benefit and not the benefit of John 
H. Morgan, Jr. and that, therefore, the defendant 
was not obligated to reimburse the plaintiff for the 
attorney fees or costs which it had expended. In 
15 
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discussing this point we must assume that the trial 
court was correct in holding that the defendant and 
respondent did afford John H. Morgan, Jr. cover-
age under its policy of insurance, although by so 
doing we do not intend to concede this issue. It 
should also be noted that the question involved here 
is not which of the two carriers should pay any 
judgment which m1ay have been entered against 
John H. Morgan, Jr., there being none, but whether 
the plaintiff is entitled to recover its costs in de-
fending an action brought against John H. Morgan, 
Jr., an obligation which it assumed under its own 
policy of insurance. 
This very question was involved in the case of 
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company v. 
Tri-State Insurance Company, decided in the United 
States Court of Appeals ('lOth Circuit), 285 Fed. 
('2d) 579. This was an action brought by ~ carrier 
of excess automobile liability insurance to obtain 
contribution from a primary insurer with respect 
to the amount expended in the successful defense of 
liability claims presented in the state courts against 
the insured. In the words of the Court: 
"The incident giving rise to the state 
court liability claims made 1against the com-
mon 'insured, Kerr Glass Company (Kerr), 
was an automobile accident involving a non-
owned truck being used by Kerr for a ship-
ment of that company's product in interstate 
16 
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commerce. The U.S.F & G. policy was issued 
directly to Kerr as a named insured and is 
referred to as a comprehensive general auto-
mobile liability policy. The Tri-State policy 
was issued to the owner-operator of the truck, 
one Barsh, as the named insured but defined 
'insured' as including 'any .person or organ-
ization legally responsible for the use (of 
the truck) , provided the actual use (of the 
truck) is by the named insured or with his 
permission ... ' It is not disputed that Kerr 
was an ad'di tional insured as defined in the 
Tri-State policy and as applied to the cir-
cumstance of the 1accident premising the 
claims made against Kerr. 
''Both policies contained standard indem-
nification provisions, the policy limit of U.S.F. 
& G. being $100,000 - $200,000 and Tri-State 
being $10,000 - $·20,000. Other applicable pro-
visions of both policies provided: 
" 'Insuring Agreements 
"'II. Defense, Settlement, Supplement-
ary Payments. 
" 'As respects the insuflance afforded by 
the other terms of this policy the Company 
shall: 
"'(a) defend any suit against the In-
sured alleging such injury, sickness, disease 
or destruction and seeking damages on ac-
count thereof, even if such suit is groundless, 
false or fraudulent; * * *. 
"'The amounts incurred under this in-
suring agreement, except settlements of c1aims 
and suits, are payable by the Company in 
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" 'Conditions 
* * * 
"'13. Other Insurance. If the Insured 
has other insurance against a loss covered by 
this policy the Company shall not be liable 
under this policy for a greater proportion of 
such loss than the applicable limit of liability 
stated in the declarations bears to the total 
applicable limit of li:ability of all valid ;and 
collectible insurance against such loss; pro-
vided, however, the insurance under this policy 
with respect to loss arising out of the use of 
any non-owned automobile shall be excess in-
surance over any other V1alid and collectible 
insurance available to the Insured, either as 
an Insured under a policy applicable with re-
spect to such automobile or otherwise.'" 
A lawsuit was filed agiainst Kerr which Tri-
State refused to defend, and thereupon U.S.F. & G. 
undertook the sole defense in behalf of Kerr. A 
judgment was obtained against Kerr in the lower 
court, which was set aside upon appeal to the Su-
preme Court of Oklahom~a. The amount sought in 
the action was the reasonable cost, including attorney 
fees, of the defense made by U.S.F. & G. The Court 
said: 
"An insurance carrier has the duty tD 
use the utmost good faith in the disposition 
of cla:lms made ag1ainst ilts insured. National 
Mutual Casualty Co. v. Britt, 203 Okl. 175, 
200 P. 2d 407, 218 P. 2d 1039; American Fi-
deHty & Casualty Co. v. All American Bus 
Lines, 10 Cir., 190 F. 2d 234. And this duty 
is not lessened by the existence of excess in-
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surance but is extended to include the excess 
carrier within the shelter of the obligation. 
St. Paul...:Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Martin, 
10 Cir., 190 F. 2d 455. The oblig1ation to the 
excess carrier is not contractual and is based 
only upon 'the duty of the primary carrier to 
perform the obligation which it alone has as-
sumed, that is, provide primary coverage. Lack 
of good :faith in this regard may extend the 
primary carrier's obligation beyond the stated 
policy limit, St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. 
v. M1artin, supra, and extend the point at 
which the secondary liability of the excess 
carrier attaches. But contrary to the conten-
tentions of U.S.F. & G. these rules 1are not 
applicable to the instant case. That company 
did not pay out any sum under its excess in-
surance provision. As we have earlier indic-
ated, the claim against Kerr Wlas ultimately 
held to be without merit and the conduct of 
Tri-State has not damaged U.S.F. & G. by 
way of indemnification to its insured. 
"Tri-State did breach its contract with 
Kerr by refusing to defend. This obligation 
existed regardless of the merit or lack of 
merit of the claim. But again, no contractual 
relationship existed between Tri-State and 
U.S.F. & G. and the latter does not claim by 
subrogation. U.S~F. & G. also had a policy 
obligation to defend Kerr and this obligation, 
unlike the secondary liability as an excess 
carrier for indemnification, was a primary 
obligation co-existent with that of Tri-State. 
The agreement to furnish such service, sever-
al with the two companies, is distinct from 
and in addition to the insuring agreement per-
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taining to liability. The question here thus 
narrows to whether contribution will lie be-
tween two insurance companies when each 
has a policy containing a defense 1a;greement. 
The question has 'been answered in the nega-
tive, and we believe, properly so, in a number 
of cases. The duty to defend is personal to 
each insurer. The obligation is several 1and 
the carrier is not entitled to divide the duty 
nor require contribution from another absent 
a specific con tractua:l right . . . '' 
To the same effect see the case of Financial 
Indemnity Company v. Colon~al Insurance Company 
(California), 281 Pac. ( 2d) 883. In this action plain-
tiff sued for declaratory relief to determine the 
rights and obligations of the parties arising from 
two public liability policies issued respectively by 
the parties to one Charles Tamagri, a trucking ser-
vice operator, and particularly to recover half of the 
amount expended by plaintiff for attorney fees and 
investigation expense in defense of an action agiainst 
the insured. Plaintiff appealed on an agreed State-
ment Of Facts from a judgment denying recovery. 
The plaintiff had defended the insured successfully 
in a personal injury action. A considerable portion 
of the briefs was devoted to the question of whether 
or not one insurance company would be required to 
contribute to the other insurance company had a 
judgment been secured against the insured. The Su-
preme Court of the State of California said: 
"The issue of defendant's indemnity li-
20 
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ability is immaterial. Each policy provided 
for defense of the assured in the event of suit. 
Plaintiff's policy provided for pro rata pay-
ment of a loss in the event there was other 
insurance. Defendant's policy provided, in case 
of other insurance, tha:t it would pay only the 
excess of the loss over the amount of the other 
insurance. Attached to each policy was a 
'Standard Form of Endorsement Prescribed 
by the Public Utilities Commission of the State 
of California' known as 'Form T & S 391' 
which apparently reduced the liability under 
each policy to $5,000 for personal injury. Most 
of the trial and a large portion of the briefs 
were devoted to the question of whether under 
the policies and the endorsement defendant's 
li'ability in the event Oritz had recovered dam-
ages against Tamagri, would not h!ave accrued 
until plaintiff had paid the 'full face ~alue of 
its policy as limited by the rider, $'5,000 or 
when it had paid only $'2,500. The trial court 
found thJat the insured's policy with plaintiff 
constituted 'other insurance' and that defend-
ant's policy was excess over and above the 
limits of plaintiff's policy and not pro-rata 
insurance. Plaintiff attacks this finding. How-
ever, we fail to understand how this question 
is relevant or important to the real issues in 
this case. Tamagri won the personal injury 
action, so neither insurer was called upon to 
pay any amount of indemnity. Oritz sued 
Tamagri for $100,680.58. Until the action 
was fully tried and judgment rendered, neith-
er insurer would know what its indemnity 
liability was. Obviously the amount sued for 
was in excess of the total liability of both in-
surers under any theory. Each party was re-
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quired by its own policy to defend Tamagri 
in that suit. 
"Plaintiff contends that as to the obliga-
tion to defend the two insurance companies 
were cosureties and not coinsurers, 1and that 
therefore the rule set forth in Fidelity & Cas-
ualty Co. of New York v. Fireman's F. I. 
Co., 38 Cal. App. 2d 1, 15, 100 'P. 2d 364, should 
apply. ]twas there held as to indemnity thJat 
where two insurance companies fully insure 
the same risk and one complany pays the total 
loss, that company may force contribution 
from the other, but that if both policies con-
tain a pro-rata or coinsurer clause, the in-
surers are deemed to be coinsurers and not 
cosureties and nei1ther can recover from the 
other rany amount it may have paid in excess 
of its pro rata share of the entire loss. While 
the fact that here both companies in their 
policies agreed to defend the assured 'bears 
some analogy to the situation where both com-
panies have agreed to indemnify the 1assured 
against the total loss, nevertheless the agree-
ment to defend is not only completely inde-
pendent of and severable from the indemnity 
provisions of the policy, but is completely dif-
ferent. Indemnity contemplates merely the 
payment of money. The agreement to defend 
con tern plates the rendering of services. The 
insurer must investigate, and conduct the de-
fense, ~and may if it deems it expedient, nego-
tiate and make a settlement of the suit. These 
matters each insurer is required to do regard-
less of what the other insurer is doing. While 
both n1ay join together in the services and 
share experiences, there is no requirement 
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that they do so. Conceivably, one might dis-
agree with the other as to the strategy of the 
investigation and defense. It could act inde-
pendently of the other. Thus the relationship 
is more that of coinsurer than cosurety. As 
to the assured, neither one is excused to any 
extent from its full duty to defend, no matter 
what the other does. The duty to defend is 
personal to the particular insurer. It is not 
entitled to divide that duty with or require 
contribution from the other.'' 
In Traveler's Indemnity Company v. American 
Indemnity Company (Tex1as), 315 S.D. ('2d) 677 
an action was brought by the plain tiff insurer 
against the defendant insurer to recover a pro rata 
share of a settlement it had made with an injured 
third person and for attorney fees. The trial court 
rendered a judgment for the plaintiff for a share 
of the settlement and a:ttorney fees, but the judg-
ment was modified by the Court of Civil Appeals 
hy eliminating attorney fees from the judgment. 
The Court held that unless provided for by contract 
or statute 'attorney fees may not be recovered. 
In a case decided in the United States District 
Court in Minnesota, Traveler's Insurance Company 
v. American Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 115'4 Fed. 
Supp. 393, the court, while holding tha;t the plaintiff 
insurer was entitled to recover from the defendant 
insurer the amount of a judgment against its in-
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"With regard to costs of defense and at-
torney fees both insurers were obligated to 
defend Schneider's suit. This obligation was 
several :and not joint; consequently Travelers, 
having paid these costs, is not entitled to re-
cover for them against American." 
Some of the authorities cited by the plaintiff 
concern only the question ras to whether or not an 
excess insurance carrier can recover from a pri-
mary insurance carrier the amount of 1a settlement 
or judgment which 'the excess insurance carrier has 
paid on behalf of the insured, 1and are not directed 
toward the question as to whether one insurer can 
recover attorney fees from another. 
In the case of Aetna Casualty & Surety Com-
pany v. Buckeye Union Casualty Company, '1157 Ohio 
St. 385, 105 N.E. (2d) 568, cited on page 6 of the 
plaintiff's and Appellrant's Brief, the only question 
involved was whether or not one insurance company 
could recover from another insurance company the 
1amount of the settlement which the first insurance 
company had made on behalf of an insured. The case 
does not discuss the question of costs of defense or 
attorney fees. 
Nor was this que~tion discussed in Kenner v. 
Century Indemnity Company, 320 Mass. 6, 67 N.E. 
(2d) 769, 16'5 A.L.R. 1463. 
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CONCLUSION 
An insurance policy is a contract between an 
insurer land the named insured or those persons fall-
ing within the definition of an "insured" under the 
omnibus c~ause of such policy, whereby the insurer 
agrees within certain limits to answer for damages 
which the insured may become legally obligated to 
pay because of certain events or conditions outlined 
in the policy of insurance; and the insured agrees 
to pay a premium commensurate with the amount 
of protection afforded. The premium chJarged for 
the policy will, of course, vary with the risk to which 
the insurer exposes itself. Where there is greater 
risk involved in insuring those people who fall with-
in a certain class than is usulal and ordinary, then 
a different premium is charged for those policies 
which insure that particullar class and special poli-
cies are written. Exclusions are written into the 
usual and ordinary policy which would exclude cov-
erage for such persons or individUials at the rates 
charged for the usual and ordinary policy. An al-
terna:tive might be to leave these exclusions out of 
a policy and increase the premium charged for all 
policies, but this would only penalize the whole for 
the hazards connected with insuring a certain group. 
One group which has been found to be more hazard-
ous is thJat group of persons engaged in the auto-
mdbile business such as automobile repair shops, 
sales agencies, garages and the like. 
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Subject only to the limitations prescribed by 
the laws of the various states as a condition to an 
insurance company's writing insurlance in a partic-
ular state, which laws are designed to afford the 
public ample protection, !an insured and an insurer 
should be free to enter into whatever contracts they 
desire and an insurer should be free to select that 
group of persons which it desires to insure for a 
specified rate. One of the provisions contained in 
insurance policies and contained in the policy issued 
by the defendant Farmers Insurance ExchJange in 
this case is that insurance afforded under the policy 
does not apply while the automobile described in 
the policy is being used in the automobile business 
where it is not being used by the named insured 
or his relatives. The cases cited herein evidence 
the courts do give effect to these exclusions in in-
surance policies. 
The particular ph~aseology of the exclusion in 
this case, "while the described automobile is being 
used in the automobile business", is somewhat new 
but has been defined ~as the business of selling, re-
pairing, servi\cing or parking of automobiles; and 
an automobile used in the automobile business has 
been held to be one which was employed for some 
purpose in connection with that business, such as 
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The evidence in this case shows that the named 
insured under the defendant's and respondent's 
policy, R1aymond Earl Thomas, permitted John H. 
Morgan, J 1·. to take his automobile while the auto-
m·dbile of John H. Morgan, Jr. was being repaired 
by the garage which employed Mr. Thomas. Mr. 
Thomas was not even acquainted with Mr. Morgan. 
The only possible benefit which Mr. Thomas could 
have hoped to secure was the future good-will 1and 
patronage of Mr. Morgan. Moreover, the automo-
bile of Mr. Thomas was being used in ex1actly the 
same manner as an automobile provided by the gar-
~age for the same purpose had one been available. 
It is, therefore, apparent that this automobile was 
being used in the automobile business at the time 
and that coverage was not, therefore, afforded under 
the defendant's and respondent's policy. 
Even assuming, however, that John H. Morgan, 
Jr. was an insured under the defendant's and re-
spondent's policy, this does not entitle the plaintiff 
and appellant to recover from the defendant the 
'attorney fees and costs which it incurred in defend-
ing an action brought against Mr. Morgan as are-
sult of an accident which occurred when he was using 
Mr. Thomas' car. The evidence is undisputed that 
John H. Morgan, Jr. was 'also 'insured by ran 'insur-
ance policy issued by the plain tiff and that by its 
policy it agreed to pay all expenses incurred by it 
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and all costs arising out of an action brought ag1ainst 
its insured falling within the coverage provided by 
the policy. In defending John H. Morgan, Jr. it did 
nothin'g which it was not already obligated to do 
by its policy of insurance. To s'ay th!a;t it is entitled 
to recover these attorney fees and costs from this 
defendant is merely to say that it should be paid 
for doing what i1t was already obligated to do. 
The fact that one insurer m1ay bre'ach its con-
tract with the insured does not justify another in-
surer from breaching its contract; nor should the 
fact that one breaches its contract give the other 
any right 1a:gainst the one guilty of such breach. 
To say that the plaintiff is subrogated to the rights 
of John H. Morgan, Jr. begs the question. In the 
first instance, he was paid no attorney fees or costs 
nor has any judgment been rendered against him 
~and he, therefore, has no rights. In the second in-
stance, we m1ight ask what rights - those which 
he had against the defendant under its policy or 
those which he had against the plaintiff under its 
policy? 
The cases which have dealt with the right of 
one insurer to recover a1ttorney fees and costs from 
another 'insurer have recognized that the duty to 
defend the insured is personal to each insurer and 
is a several and not a joint obligation. The fact that 
one insurer, acting in good faith upon grounds which 
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appear to it to be justified at the time, may escape 
its obligation to the insured may not justify another 
insurer from escaping its obligation. 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the 
judgment of the tri1al court should be affirmed 
either upon the theory that the defendant and re-
spondent did not afford insurance coverage under 
this case or that, affording it, the plaintiff insurer 
is not entitled 'to recover attorney fees 'and costs 
paid out under its policy of insu~ance from the de-
fendant insurer. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GAR'RETT 
DON J. HANSON 
Attorneys for 
Defendants and Respondents 
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